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The IR&D Program of the Department of Defense
I. INTRODUCTION
Independent Research and Development and Bid and Pro­
posal (IR&D/B&P) are two important but little known programs 
by which the Defense Department supports in-house research and 
development done by the nation's defense contractors. In con­
trast to the R&D which these firms perform on contract for DOD 
or for other customers, IR&D is company-initiated; it differs, 
however, from the in-house R&D of nondefense industries in the 
way in which it is paid for. Under DOD regulations IR&D 
costs are allowable costs which can be charged as overhead on 
defense contracts. Since the prices of most defense contracts 
are negotiated on the basis of the contractor's costs, the 
defense company, unlike a company selling in ordinary markets, 
is certain of covering a large fraction of the cost of its 
IR&D program.
Bid and Proposal costs are the costs incurred in pre­
paring bids for contracts or in submitting unsolicited propo­
sals to the government; these costs too can be charged against 
government contracts. B&P includes both the administrative 
costs of proposal preparation and the costs of developing 
supporting technical data to respond to government specifica­
tions. In practice the latter costs are indistinguishable 
from those for IR&D, and for most purposes IR&D and B&P can 
be considered together. The Defense Department has recognized 
this overlap by setting up similar rules for the two categories 
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in its procurement regulations. In this paper we shall refer 
mainly to IR&D, with the understanding that the discussion is 
applicable to a large part of the B&P program also.
In 1974 the major defense contractors recovered $808 
million from the Defense Department for IR&D/B&P costs, and 
an additional amount, estimated at about $200 million, was 
paid to smaller contractors.But this money did not appear 
in the DOD budget under the heading "Research, Development, 
Test and Evaluation" (RDT&E), nor were any specific results 
of the program listed in the Director of Defense Research and
2 
Engineering's (DDRE's) annual report to Congress. Because 
DOD1s share of IR&D/B&P costs is paid through overhead charges 
on defense contracts, the program is not identified in the 
budget. Most of the money for IR&D comes from the procure­
ment section of the budget, with the RDT&E budget contributing 
only the proportion which is charged via overhead to R&D 
contracts. This anomalous situation is an important factor 
in explaining the relative obscurity of the IR&D program. 
Each year Congressional committees hold extensive hearings on 
the RDT&E budget of the Pentagon, yet the IR&D program was 
virtually unknown to the Congress until Senator Proxmire first 
focused attention on it in 1969. At that time Senator 
McIntyre, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Research and Develop­
ment of the Senate Armed Services Committee, admitted on the
3 
floor of the Senate that he had never before heard of IR&D.
The following year Congress held hearings on IR&D and 
passed legislation mandating certain procedures for DOD's 
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management of the IR&D/B&P program. The Commission on Gov­
ernment Procurement took up the question, and the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) has made a series of studies on the 
implementation of the 1970 law. Most recently, in September 
1975, the Subcommittee on Research and Development, Senate 
Armed Services Committee, and the Subcommittee on Priorities 
and Economy in Government, Joint Economic Committee, held
. 4
three days of hearings on the IR&D program.
Throughout the hearings the defense contractors have 
strongly supported IR&D as a normal business practice, one 
whose costs should be recovered from the Defense Department 
as from any other customer. They argue that their IR&D pro­
grams provide incentives for innovative work and a flexi­
bility which are lacking in contract R&D. The Pentagon also 
supports the program, extolling it as a way of encouraging 
new ideas, increasing competition in the defense industry, 
and maintaining a healthy technology base at a relatively low 
cost to the government. Critics, however, claim that the 
IR&D program is unnecessary, given the billions spent for 
contract R&D each year by the Defense Department. They argue 
that there is no evidence that the benefits of the program 
have been commensurate with its costs; indeed, it is described 
as a virtual subsidy to the defense industry. Some companies, 
it is charged, have used IR&D funds to gain a technological 
advantage in their nondefense undertakings, or to cover cost 
overruns on defense contracts. But the chief criticism has 
been leveled at the fact that the program has been funded 
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outside the regular RDT&E budget of the Defense Department 
withough Congressional oversight.
Although the dollar amounts reimbursed by the Defense 
Department for IR&D programs appear small relative to a $100 
billion defense budget, they are substantial compared to 
other categories of government spending. For example, funds 
for IR&D/B&P have exceeded the total National Science Founda­
tion budget for every year for which data are available. 
Within the defense budget, IR&D/B&P funds equal about 10 per­
cent of the RDT&E budget, and about 40 percent of the funds 
allocated by DOD to its own in-house laboratories. DOD pay­
ments for IR&D (not including B&P) are almost equal to the 
amounts spent in industry via RDT&E contracts for support of 
the defense technology base. Viewing these figures as an 
expression of a national science policy, we can ask whether 
this distribution of resources between different R&D programs 
is an optimal one.
The support of defense research and development work 
outside the RDT&E budget raises the question of accountability 
to Congress. At present, the size of the IR&D program is not 
subject to external budget review, but instead is the result 
of internal DOD decisions and negotiations with its major 
contractors. The only mechanisms for Congressional oversight 
in the program are the opportunity to ask questions during 
Congressional hearings on the defense budget and a require­
ment for an annual report on IR&D/B&P. The annual reports, 
however, are not very informative. They list the IR&D/B&P 
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costs of the major defense contractors as a group and DOD's 
share of those costs, but there are no details on which com­
panies receive the money and what they do with it. Nor does 
the annual report attempt to demonstrate the ways in which 
the program is responding to the formal goals set for it by 
DOD. The lack of this type of information effectively pre­
cludes the Congress from forming a valid judgment on the 
value of the IR&D program.
In addition to the question of Congressional oversight 
there is also the question of the Pentagon's management of 
the IR&D program. Over the years, the Defense Department 
has developed management procedures which are described as 
providing adequate control over the size and quality of IR&D 
programs in the individual firms without interfering in the 
ability of the firms to make independent decisions on the 
direction of their programs. These procedures include tech­
nical evaluation by DOD scientists of the IR&D programs of 
the major defense contractors, and the negotiation of ceilings 
on the dollar amounts which DOD will pay. The effectiveness 
of these measures, however, may be doubted. In practice 
DOD's evaluation of the technical quality of a company's 
proposed IR&D program has only a limited effect on the nego­
tiations for its program ceiling, although such a link would 
seem to be a prerequisite of good management. Furthermore, 
there is still disagreement over some of the principles 
embodied in DOD's rules on IR&D. Should the Defense Depart­
ment support only R&D which is relevant to the defense 
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function or should it accept a broader definition of rele­
vance? Should projects which are aimed at commercial markets 
be allowed? Are on-site reviews of IR&D programs indispen­
sable to evaluation procedures or are they an expensive 
luxury which can be replaced by review of technical write­
ups? How serious are the problems posed by what is politely 
called "creative accounting," i.e., the problem of companies 
classifying their costs in ways designed to enhance their 
cost recovery from the government. These questions are im­
portant because an evaluation of the IR&D program must 
consider not only the stated goals for the program but also 
whether or not it functions to fulfill those goals.
A final category of issues are those which may be 
grouped together as indirect effects of the IR&D program. 
The disbursement of large amounts of money, for certain 
activities only, and to certain firms only, inevitably has 
had effects on the internal structure of the firms, on the 
overall structure of the industry, and conceivably, on the 
defense posture of the United States. IR&D projects repre- 
sent an entry point into the weapons pipeline; indeed, hope 
of winning future contracts is the major incentive for firms 
doing IR&D. If, as some have argued, U.S. weapons decisions 
are often the result of a technological imperative rather 
than stemming from a rational analysis of military require­
ments, then IR&D represents an early step in the development 
of technological pressures. It is possible that the cumula­
tive impact of these indirect effects in the areas of industry 
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structure and strategic decisions are more important to our 
ultimate judgment of IR&D than the evaluation of the stated 
aims of the program, more narrowly defined. Before these 
policy issues can be adequately dealt with, however, we must 
describe more fully the historical growth of the program, 
the current industry environment, and the character of DOD
* 
controls.
II. BACKGROUND
History of the Program
The evolution of the present IR&D program can be traced 
to the period during and following World War II. The govern­
ment's wartime reliance on private industry for its military 
procurement needs continued into the post-war period. It 
led to the apparently permanent arrangement we now have in 
which private contractors supply not only military products, 
but also most of the R&D for new weapons. As the contractual 
arrangements between government and the defense industry have 
grown in number and complexity, the Armed Services Procurement 
Regulations (ASPR) which set forth the rules governing these 
contracts have undergone constant expansion and change. The 
rules for cost recovery of expenditures for IR&D/B&P are no 
exception.
The first edition of ASPR in 1949 allowed contractors 
to charge contract-related development costs and bid and 
proposal expense to their DOD contracts, but did not allow 
independent research costs unless specific authorization was 
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included in the contract. Contracts with the large defense 
contractors often carried such authorization, but the prac­
tice was not uniform. The revised cost principles issued in 
1959 marked the beginning of the current practices. Costs 
for independent research were to be routinely allowed, sub­
ject to tests for reasonableness and allocability. "Reason­
ableness" is, in practice, defined by the negotiator for DOD; 
allocability refers to the pro-rating of a contractor's costs 
across all of his customers in proportion to their share of 
his total business.
With the new rules for accepting IR&D costs, DOD began 
to impose controls on the sums it was paying out. Large 
companies were asked to negotiate advance agreements which 
set dollar ceilings on their IR&D programs. In an effort to 
provide incentives for efficient use of the funds, cost­
sharing between the government and the contractor was required 
for IR&D costs, although not for B&P expense. Predictably, 
this led companies to classify as much as possible of their 
development costs under the heading B&P. This, in turn, led 
to chronic disagreement between the Defense Department and 
its contractors over the proper classification of costs, and 
to a lack of uniformity of treatment between services and 
between different contracting officers.
During the 1960's significant changes were also being 
made in DOD's overall procurement policies in an attempt to 
deal with the cost growth which had been common in the 1950's. 
Among the new management controls introduced under Secretary 
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of Defense McNamara was an increased use of fixed price in­
centive contracts to replace cost-plus contracts. From 1951 
to 1960 the proportion of cost-plus contracts had grown from 
13 percent to 43 percent, but under McNamara it declined, 
reaching a low of 21 percent in 1966-67.5 A procedure called 
"total package procurement" (TPP) was introduced, designed to 
shift to the contractor the responsibility for cost overruns. 
Under TPP the contractor was asked to commit himself to a 
price for production at the time the contract for development 
work was awarded, in an effort to eliminate the practice of 
"buying in" with a low initial bid and "getting well" later.
The effect of these changes was to increase the con­
tractor's vulnerability to cost overruns caused by unantici­
pated technical problems. Under fixed-price type contracts 
the increased contractor risk could be offset to some extent 
by inflating the target costs in the contract in order to 
reduce the likelihood of overruns/ Another response was the 
use of IR&D programs to solve technical problems, with cost 
recovery via IR&D/B&P or another, related, cost category,
7"Other Technical Effort" (OTE). These indirect cost cate­
gories were used to cover the costs of technical preparation 
for contracts, costs which had previously been absorbed
g
rather easily under cost-plus contracts. The result was a 
substantial growth in IR&D/B&P costs during the 1960's.
The McNamara reforms proved unsuccessful in controlling 
the costs of defense procurement, as notably illustrated by 
the case of the C5-A aircraft. They were dropped in the early 
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1970's in favor of a return to separate contracts for develop­
ment and production, the use of cost-plus contracts for the 
development stage, and an emphasis on using competitive proto­
types as the basis for procurement decisions. IR&D/B&P costs 
have not fallen off, however, except for a brief drop in 
1970-71. Instead, there have been substantial forces at work, 
described in later sections of this paper, which have tended 
to maintain the size of the program.
Table 1 shows DOD reimbursement to major contractors 
for these cost categories, both in dollars and as a percent 
of their sales to DOD, from 1963-1974. These figures are 
estimated to cover 80 to 85 percent of DOD's total IR&D pro­
gram; they do not include the DOD's share of IR&D/B&P costs
g
for smaller contractors. Allowing for unreported costs,
DOD's payments for IR&D/B&P for 1974 were in the neighborhood 
of one billion dollars. Although there are difficulties with 
these data because of frequent shifts in definitions and 
coverage, the steady upward trend during the 1960's is un­
mistakable.1^ Data from NASA are also included, since its 
IR&D program is modeled on DOD1s and covers many of the same 
major contractors as DOD's. The absolute size of NASA's 
IR&D/B&P program has shrunk with the cutbacks in spending for 
space programs, and, unlike DOD, program payments as a 
percent of sales to NASA have declined since 1971.
The upward trend in DOD's spending for IR&D was inter­
rupted in FY 1970 by two developments. One was the drop in 
procurement spending with the wind-down of U.S. involvement
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in the Vietnam War. Since DOD's share of IR&D/B&P costs is 
paid as an overhead charge on defense contracts, it tends 
to drop with a drop in military procurement. The second 
factor was that in 1969, for the first time, Congress became 
aware of the IR&D program, and an attempt to limit it was 
written into the FY 1970 Military Procurement Authorization 
Bill (PL 91-121). The language adopted can only be described 
as ridiculous (spending was limited to 93 percent of what 
it "would have otherwise been," a completely unspecified base 
figure), but the spectre of Congressional interest apparently 
had an inhibiting effect on the growth of IR&D spending.
The opening skirmish in 1969 was followed by Congres­
sional hearings in both the House and Senate during 1970, and 
new language on IR&D was included in the Military Procurement 
Authorization Act for FY 1971 (PL 91-441, Sec. 203). The 
law now requires that all companies receiving more than $2 
million annually in IR&D/B&P costs from the Defense Depart­
ment must have an advance agreement, establishing a firm 
dollar ceiling on DOD's contribution to these costs. The law 
further requires that the IR&D programs be evaluated for 
technical quality and for relevance to the functions of the 
DOD. Projects which do not have "potential military rele­
vance" (PMR) cannot be included in the portion of total costs 
reimbursed by DOD. Each year, the Secretary of Defense must 
submit an annual report on the IR&D/B&P program, including the 
total dollar amount paid to major defense contractors but not 
including data for individual companies. These reports are* 
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published in the Congressional Record; in addition to dollar 
amounts for the program they include a description of any 
changes in DOD's management procedures for the IR&D/B&P pro­
grams. They do not, however, provide any information on the 
projects undertaken or on their results. As a result of the 
1970 legislation, the IR&D program has greater visibility 
than it did before, but there is still no effective Congres­
sional oversight prior to the commitment of funds nor any 
evaluation by Congress of program results. The Defense De­
partment, itself, maintains only loose administrative controls 
on the program, arguing that it gains innovative capability 
in exchange for strict accountability.
Recently, another factor has entered the debate over 
public policy for IR&D. Following the Report of the Commis­
sion on Government Procurement in 1972, an interagency task 
force was established to formulate a proposal for a uniform 
IR&D policy covering all government agencies. The Commission 
divided sharply on the IR&D question; the task force chose to 
propose retaining the current DOD policy, revised only to 
require government-wide relevance instead of potential mili­
tary relevance for IR&D projects. This recommendation, if 
accepted by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, will 
require congressional action before being implemented, since 
the relevancy proposal involves changes to the 1970 legisla­
tion (PL 91-441) .1;L
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IR&D in Relation to Other DOD Programs for R&D
The IR&D program must be viewed in the perspective of 
the total program for military R&D. The Defense Department 
currently spends about $10 billion per year on its budgeted 
RDT&E. The DOD's payments to major companies alone for 
IR&D/B&P equal nearly 10 percent of this amount, a fraction 
which increased steadily during the 1960's as the IR&D pro­
gram grew (see Table 2). The payments are a much more sub­
stantial fraction of that portion of the budgeted R&D which 
goes to support the technology base. Funds in two cate­
gories of RDT&E, Basic and Applied Research (6.1) and Ex­
ploratory Development (6.2) are usually taken as being 
equivalent to spending on the technology base (although DOD 
has recently begun to include some projects from the 6.3 
category, Advanced Development, also). In FY 1974 DOD pay­
ments for IR&D alone, not including B&P, were equal to about 
30 percent of the total budgeted for the 6.1-6.2 categories. 
More significantly, they were almost equal to the amounts 
spent in industry through RDT&E contracts for the technology 
base (Table 3). Thus the IR&D program is potentially an 
important addition to the resources available for developing 
the technology base, especially in the private industrial 
sector.
IR&D's relation to the RDT&E budget can be viewed in 
another light. The funds expended are used for programs 
which are part of the R&D function. But the actual costs 
are reimbursed through overhead charges allocated to all of 
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a contractor's business. This means that the RDT&E budget 
is charged for only about 30 percent of the DOD's payments 
for IR&D costs, with the rest coming out of the procurement
12budget. Although reaching 10 percent of the RDT&E budget, 
the IR&D/B&P program is equal to an overhead charge of only 
3.5 to 4.0 percent on the IR&D companies' total sales to the 
Defense Department. From this point of view, IR&D repre­
sents a bargain for the R&D program of the Defense Department, 
while still not looming large in the procurement category.
III. IR&D AND THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
The Defense Department's Objectives for the IR&D Program
The Defense Department has consistently supported the 
IR&D program as an important element in its total R&D pro­
gram and in its relationships with military contractors.
13 Formally, three objectives are listed for the IR&D program.
First, IR&D is seen as a means of strengthening the technology 
base of the industry. The absence of tight DOD controls, 
it is argued, creates an environment conducive to real inno­
vation. The IR&D program provides incentives to the defense 
firms to allocate resources to R&D in military-related areas 
and to explore a diversity of approaches to technical problems 
in addition to those chosen for funding through contract R&D. 
The Defense Department claims also that the IR&D program 
reduces the total costs of weapons procurement by allowing
I
DOD to purchase already developed components "off the shelf."
A second, related objective given for the IR&D program 
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is to increase competition in the defense market by developing 
technical competence in more than one supplier for any speci­
fic requirement which the DOD may have. By this use of the 
word "competition" the Defense Department obviously does not 
intend the specialized meaning of the economist, who refers 
to a market characterized by many buyers and sellers, a homo­
genous product, and free entry. The defense market deviates 
sharply from this ideal type, but, by supporting more than 
one contractor in a technical area, the DOD hopes to gain 
some of the benefits of competition. In addition to the gains 
in innovation resulting from increased technological rivalry, 
an effect which properly belongs under the first objective, 
the presence of alternative sources of supply reduces the 
market power of individual contractors and protects the DOD 
from the risks of relying on a single firm. It may also 
result in lower prices, although, for a variety of reasons, 
price competition is not strong in the defense market.
The third objective listed by the DOD for the IR&D 
program views it as contributing "as appropriate" to the 
economic stability of the defense industry by encouraging 
diversification within the individual firm. Such diversifi­
cation reduces the firm's vulnerability to shifts in pro­
curement policy, and, it is hoped, enhances the long-run 
health of the industry.
It should be noted that the objectives stated by DOD 
for the IR&D program are not wholly consistent. Encouraging 
firms to diversify may in fact lead to resources being pulled 
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from the defense market. Maintaining alternative suppliers 
in specialized technical areas does not necessarily yield 
lower prices for defense procurement; the market may be
. . . 14shared according to some non-competitive principle. Further­
more, the IR&D program is poorly designed to increase the 
numbers of alternative suppliers. Because IR&D costs are 
recovered through an overhead charge, the largest sums of 
money go to the largest, well-established defense contractors 
and to those technical areas for which there are already many 
contracts. Electronics is an obvious example: of the top 100 
DOD prime contractors in fiscal year 1974, nineteen were in 
the electronics industry,and other major contractors, par­
ticularly in the aircraft industry, also performed military- 
related electronics work. Meanwhile, less-populated technical 
areas where the DOD might wish to increase the number of 
suppliers receive a relatively small portion of the total 
IR&D funds. And firms outside the defense market do not 
receive any of the program funds, even though entry by such 
firms would provide both new technical initiatives and a 
larger measure of competition.
There are other DOD programs which serve the same 
objectives as those held for the IR&D program and do so 
within a framework of contractor accountability. The will­
ingness of the Defense Department to spend close to a billion 
dollars a year on IR&D/B&P without such accountability is 
thus somewhat puzzling; it seems to flow from a mixture of a 
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genuine belief in the program's contributions to innovation 
in defense technology and a willingness to accommodate its 
contractors.
DOD's Management Structure for the IR&D Program
Following the Congressional action of 1970, the ASPR 
were amended to incorporate the legislation's requirements 
for advance agreements, technical evaluation and potential 
military relevance for IR&D. Advance agreements and tech­
nical evaluations of its largest contractors were already 
features of DOD's management of the IR&D programs but a new 
formal structure was now created to oversee DOD policy. 
Heading the new structure is the IR&D Policy Council, made 
up of the Defense Director for Research and Engineering 
(DDR&E), the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Comptroller 
and for Installations and Logistics (I&L), and the Assistant 
Secretaries for R&D and for I&L from each of the services. 
The Policy Council is responsible for the DOD's overall 
policy on IR&D, including determination of the level of sup­
port for the program and the criteria for potential military 
relevance. Reporting to the Policy Council is the Technical 
Evaluation Group which establishes the procedures for the 
technical evaluation of the IR&D programs of the major de­
fense companies. There is also an informally organized group 
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (I&L) which 
serves as liaison between the contract negotiators in the 
three services.
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Implementation of DOD policy for IR&D rests on (a)
the scientists at the military laboratories who do the tech­
nical evaluations, (b) the service negotiators who carry out 
the negotiations of advance agreements with the major com­
panies, and (c) the staff of the Defense Contract Administra­
tion Service (DCAS) and the Defense Contract Audit Agency 
(DCAA), who administer and audit the IR&D clauses of a con­
tract. The latter organizations are not usually important 
elements in the management of IR&D; the program is just too 
small relative to their other concerns to gain much attention 
from the auditors.
How the Program Operates
Each defense contractor with an IR&D program goes 
through an annual cycle of internal decision-making and inter­
action with the Department of Defense in planning and perform­
ing its IR&D. The most important stages in this process are 
described below, first for a major company with an advance
15 agreement and then for a company without an advance agreement.
1. Program planning by the company
The defense firm realistically see its IR&D program as 
an important element in its pursuit of new contracts. Through 
IR&D projects the firm can develop its technical capability 
to bid for and obtain future contracts and can communicate 
its successful developments to the Defense Department, with 
the hope that they will reappear as future procurement re­
quests. Informal contacts with the DOD are important, since 
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a firm which learns of a procurement action only through a 
formal "request for proposal" will be months behind its 
better informed rivals in preparing to bid. The contacts 
are made through organized seminars, visits to project of­
fices in DOD, the review process for IR&D technical plans, 
and on-site visits. In addition, companies will scan DOD's 
formal planning documents and the specialized journals such 
as Aviation Week and Space Technology for clues as to which 
technical areas are most likely to be funded. These efforts 
form the background for the company's selection of its own 
IR&D projects.
By the beginning of its fiscal year, each major con­
tractor for DOD (or NASA) puts together a technical plan or 
"brochure" for its IR&D program for the coming year, selecting 
from the projects proposed by its staff those which appear 
most likely to lead to future contracts. The technical plan 
of a large company will run to several hundred pages and may 
contain descriptions and projected costs for literally hun­
dreds of projects, ranging from short-term exploratory efforts 
to large-scale development projects.
Strategies in selecting IR&D portfolios vary consider­
ably between firms, a fact which showed up even within the 
small sample of companies interviewed for this study. A 
firm may choose to concentrate its resources in a few, large 
projects on the grounds that this strategy leads to better 
ratings during the technical evaluation procedure. Large 
well-funded projects appear important to the evaluator, and 
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there is a greater probability that something will be accom­
plished with a substantial investment in dollars and manpower. 
Other firms undertake many separate projects each year, most 
of them relatively small in scope. The emphasis here is on 
short-term exploratory efforts, making the most of the 
flexibility which IR&D offers over contract R&D.
2. Technical evaluation of the proposed program by
the DOD
The company sends its technical plan to the designated 
manager of its "lead" service, that is, the military depart­
ment which has been assigned responsibility for handling IR&D 
matters for this particular company on behalf of DOD as a 
whole. The manager circulates the individual project descrip­
tions to the appropriate service laboratories (including 
laboratories of other services) for expert evaluation. Each 
project is given a score by the service evaluator and is 
checked for potential military relevance. The technical 
ratings for all the company's projects are then weighted by 
dollar cost and consolidated into a single numerical score 
on a scale of 1 to 10. This rating is forwarded to the ser­
vice's negotiating team. Some months after the technical 
evaluation is complete the company will receive a report on 
the results, but this debriefing usually occurs near the end 
of the year, so that it is of use mainly in planning the 
next year's program.
In addition to evaluation of the written brochures, 
once every three years the DOD holds an on-site review of 
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each major company's IR&D program. The purpose of the on­
site review is to allow the DOD scientists to get a close 
look at what industry is doing and to ascertain if the 
company's written brochure properly represents its IR&D 
program. The on-site review is not a complete check on 
the regular evaluation procedures, however. Owing to limita­
tions on cost and time, only about 30 percent of a company's 
projects are covered in an on-site visit, and they are 
selected in consultation with the company to be of interest 
to the DOD personnel who will take part in the on-site 
review. Naturally, the sample of projects contains the 
company's best efforts, which tend to be viewed sympatheti­
cally by scientists with matching interests. Technical 
ratings from on-site reviews run systematically higher than
16ratings based on evaluation of written brochures.
Conspicuously lacking in the evaluation procedure is 
any comprehensive review of completed projects. Work in 
progress is evaluated partially on the basis of the portions 
already completed, but the greatest weight in the scoring is 
given to the work proposed for the future. There is no point 
in the evaluation procedure at which the results of a com­
pleted project are weighed against its total cost and com­
pared to other projects in a systematic way. The DOD and 
the industry argue that such a review would be inappropriate, 
since IR&D projects are not "purchased" by the DOD under 
contract; however, the absence of any after-the-fact evalu­
ation on a regular basis prevents the government from clearly 
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identifying the benefits and costs of the IR&D program.
3. Negotiation of an advance agreement
The company's advance agreement for its proposed IR&D 
program is negotiated between the company and its lead ser­
vice; representatives of other services and NASA are invited 
to participate, but, whether they do so or not, they are bound 
by the final results. Because of the time lags inherent in 
the technical evaluation procedures, in most cases the tech­
nical rating available to the service negotiators is the 
score earned by the company's technical plan in the previous 
year. The main factors affecting the negotiations are the 
historical size of the company's IR&D program, its expected 
sales to the DOD in the coming year, and the historical 
share of its cost borne by the DOD. The score from the 
technical evaluation and the degree of military relevance
17 also enter into the negotiation, but to a lesser degree.
This emphasis in the negotiation on historical factors creates 
a stable situation in which program size is fairly predict­
able, both for DOD and for the individual company.
The advance agreement places a ceiling on the size of 
the IR&D program which the DOD (and NASA) will accept for 
allocation. That is, the DOD agrees to pay its allocable 
share, based on its share of the company's total sales, up 
to the negotiated ceiling; the company must cover all the 
costs incurred over the ceiling. A projected overhead rate 
for IR&D, expressed as a percent of sales, is computed from 
the company's negotiated ceiling and its expected volume of 
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sales to the DOD. This rate is used in pricing all of the 
company's contracts with DOD (and NASA) for the year the 
agreement is in effect, thus relieving both the government 
and the company from the necessity of negotiating an IR&D 
overhead rate separately for each contract.
An example may be helpful. Consider a defense contrac­
tor with an expected annual sales to DOD of $500 million, an 
amount representing 75 percent of its total sales. The 
company negotiates an advance agreement with DOD for a ceiling 
of $16 million on the IR&D costs which DOD will accept for 
allocation. The $16 million ceiling represents the allowable 
costs on which the DOD will pay its allocable share of 75 
percent, or $12 million. The overhead charge for IR&D on 
contracts and subcontracts for DOD (totalling $500 million) 
would be set at 2.4 percent. A similar exercise is needed 
to arrive at a recovery rate for B&P costs. Note that the 
company must spend $16 million on IR&D to recover $12 million 
from DOD. If it spends less, it will receive proportionately 
less, but if it spends more than the ceiling it must cover 
the excess costs itself. If the actual sales of the company 
to DOD vary from the $500 million figure, the recovery rates 
for IR&D and B&P are adjusted as part of the regular post 
audit procedures.
In recent years the major companies, taken together, 
have spent more than their negotiated ceilings for IR&D/B&P 
by approximately 15 to 20 percent. The fraction of costs 
allocated to the Defense Department has ranged from 60 to 67 
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percent of the negotiated ceilings, or about 50 to 57 percent 
of the total costs incurred by the companies. The companies 
are recovering a further 5 percent or so of their total IR&D 
costs from NASA; this figure is down from a high of 17 per­
cent or more in the 1960's. The proportion of total B&P 
costs recovered from DOD and NASA is higher, equalling 75
18 percent of costs incurred in 1973.
These overall figures mask considerable variability 
between companies. The degree to which a company spends over 
its ceiling will depend on its financial condition, its per­
ception of its technological opportunities, and the toughness 
of its negotiators. The Navy and the Air Force are said to 
insist on setting ceilings somewhere below actual program 
size. This amounts to de facto cost sharing, but the sharing 
ratio will vary according to the bargain struck durihg ne­
gotiation. The ratio of cost recovery to total costs will 
also vary between companies, depending on their sales mix. 
Some of the major IR&D companies, for example Grumman Corpo­
ration or Northrop, are heavily committed to defense produc­
tion and may recover from DOD and NASA 80 to 90 percent of 
their negotiated ceilings for IR&D/B&P. Broadly diversified 
companies such as General Electric or Westinghouse would 
be expected to have a lower rate of cost recovery. However, 
most such companies are structured so that their government 
business is concentrated into one or more operating divisions. 
Each division with $250,000 or more in IR&D/B&P payments 
from the Defense Department qualifies for a separate advance 
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agreement, with the division's IR&D costs allocated across 
division sales only. Thus, by concentrating its DOD busi­
ness and IR&D program into the same divisions, a company can 
maximize its recovery rate for IR&D costs.
Ceilings on B&P expenditures are also set by negotia­
tion, but there is no requirement for technical evaluation, 
and military relevance is determined by the negotiator, not 
by the technical review process. Again, company practices 
vary greatly. Some companies restrict their use of the B&P 
cost category to only the costs of writing up a proposal. 
Other companies place the development work needed to meet 
government specifications in B&P, but consider the proposal 
preparation as selling expense, and put it in their general 
and administrative cost pool. Still others will have a mix­
ture of engineering and non-engineering costs in B&P. So 
long as a company maintains a consistent system of classifi­
cation, its B&P costs will be allowable, although the ceilings 
negotiated for B&P presumably take into consideration the 
accounting practices followed by the individual companies.
4. Performance of IR&D
The procedures for technical evaluation and negotiation 
of ceilings take several months; meanwhile the company is 
carrying out the IR&D projects listed in its technical plan 
and also beginning to plan for the next year. The company 
is not bound to perform the proposed projects listed in its 
plan, and if a new opportunity appears funds allocated to one 
project may be freely shifted to the new project. If the 
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firm wins a large contract during the year, it may reduce 
the size of its IR&D program by shifting engineers to the 
new contract work; conversely, if it loses a contract it 
may devote more resources than expected to IR&D. DOD regu­
lations allow a contractor to recover costs over his nego­
tiated ceiling for IR&D so long as the ceiling for B&P is 
reduced by the same amount (and vice versa), so that the 
two programs are interchangeable to some degree. This 
provision is said to give the contractors additional flexi­
bility to respond to unanticipated opportunities; presum­
ably it also reduces the temptation to misclassify costs 
between the two categories. In practice an average of 80
19 to 90 percent of the planned projects are carried out; a 
company with an unusually large number of uncompleted pro­
jects would probably receive a lower score in its technical 
evaluation the following year.
5. Companies without Advance Agreements
In 1974 the DOD negotiated advance agreements for
IR&D with 183 divisions of approximately 55 companies. Many 
other companies with DOD contracts recovered a portion of 
their IR&D/B&P costs from the government, although the amounts 
received were less than $2 million so that advance agreements 
were not required. For these companies, the allowability of 
their IR&D costs is determined in one of two ways, depending 
on their contract mix. A company with most of its business 
(65 percent or more) in competitive firm-fixed price contracts 
with DOD or commercial sales will have its IR&D costs
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accepted without question. For a company below this thres­
hold, the allowable size of its IR&D/B&P program is set by a 
formula utilizing data on the size of program and its ratio 
to total sales in the past. The DOD then pays its share of 
the allowable IR&D costs just as in the case of a company 
with an advance agreement. The DOD does not, however, under­
take technical evaluation or determination of military rele­
vance for these smaller companies, and, with only a few 
exceptions, data from these companies' programs are not in­
cluded in the annual reports to Congress on IR&D/B&P.
Differences Between Services in the Management of IR&D
There are substantial differences in style in the 
methods used by the three military services to manage the 
IR&D programs under their jurisdiction. The Air Force and 
the Navy are responsible for the largest number of advance 
agreements. The Army has limited its participation, both 
because the companies for which it is the most important 
customer tend not to be in high technology areas and because, 
as a matter of principle, the Army has preferred decentra­
lized contract administration. Therefore, it has passed on 
to the Defense Contract Administration Service (DCAS) the 
task of negotiating advance agreements for IR&D in a number 
of companies for which it would otherwise be responsible.
The Air Force is responsible for approximately 115 of 
the 183 contractor divisions which had advance agreements in 
1974. It has developed a fairly elaborate management system 
for its IR&D program, with' an Air Force IR&D Policy Council 
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and an internal management group which directs and oversees 
the company negotiations. There are Air Force regulations 
covering the conduct of technical evaluations, including a 
rating of the evaluators themselves, and an elaborate package 
of materials is used to communicate the results of the 
evaluation to the companies. In 1972, the Air Force began 
to link changes in a company's score from the technical 
evaluation to the company's negotiated ceiling for IR&D. Al­
though the historical size of a company's program still 
carries the greatest weight in negotiations, upward or down­
ward movements in its technical rating now yield an automatic 
adjustment in its allowable ceiling up to a maximum of +/- 
20 percent. The Air Force argues that this system of rewards 
and penalties serves as an incentive to the technical evalu­
ators as well as to the companies by enhancing the importance 
of the technical evaluation procedure.
The Navy has a less formal apparatus for making tech­
nical evaluations and using the results in the negotiation 
process. Technical evaluations are the responsibility of 
the Office of Naval Research and its branch offices. The 
evaluations follow the same format as in the Air Force, but 
there is no fixed relationship by which the company's score 
affects the negotiation result. In general the flexibility 
of an individual approach to each company is preferred to the 
use of a standard formula, and the Navy negotiator appears 
to have a large degree of autonomy in reaching advance 
agreements.
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Several reasons can be adduced to explain these dif­
ferences. The Air Force, as the youngest of the services, 
does not have the tradition of arsenals and strong in-house 
laboratories which characterize the Army and Navy, and 
therefore it tends to be more dependent on its contractors. 
Its major contractors are concentrated in the high-technology 
areas of aircraft and electronics, where IR&D has been an 
important program. The Air Force believes that its formal 
procedures assure impartiality in setting ceilings on IR&D 
programs, and are a protection against court challenges by 
its contractors. Finally, it can be said that the Air Force 
prefers formal, analytical approaches to problem-solving. 
The Navy's approach, on the other hand, appears to have 
evolved from a series of ad hoc adjustments of long-standing 
arrangements with its contractors in response to the new 
requirements imposed by DOD over the years.
/ 
Controls over Total Size of the IR&D Program
The total size of the DOD's IR&D program is the sum of 
the allowable and allocable costs from all of its contractors, 
and thus is the result of many separate decisions. Guidance 
for these decisions is supplied by the IR&D Policy Council, 
meeting in the Pentagon. The Council proceeds from a general 
feeling of how tight or loose money is for the Defense De­
partment, and a sense of the proportions it wishes to main­
tain between IR&D, contract R&D, and spending by in-house 
laboratories. The most important determinant seems to be the 
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total size of the program the year before, just as it is for 
the individual agreements.
The DOD is understandably cautious in the use of words 
like "fund" and "allocation" to describe the annual costs of 
IR&D. Such language suggests the possibility of a line item 
in the budget, something the Defense Department has repeatedly 
argued against as impracticable. Nevertheless, when there 
have been squeezes on IR&D, notably for 1970 and 1971, the 
system has responded with remarkable accuracy. In 1969 
legislation included a limit of "93 percent of what would 
otherwise have been spent" for FY 1970: DOD's 1970 spending 
for IR&D/B&P dropped to 93.6 percent of the 1969 figure, 
falling slightly more than the sales base (see Table 1). 
Similarly, the original language of Sec. 203 in the 1970 
legislation on Defense Department Authorizations for FY 1971 
called for a ceiling of $625 million for IR&D/B&P payments. 
Although this provision was dropped in conference on the 
bill, the figure for 1971 was estimated in 1972 to be $623 
million (later revised to $619 million). These two instances 
in which the DOD actually cut back on the volume of IR&D/B&P 
spending show that, despite the diffuse process for allocat­
ing IR&D funds, the requirement for negotiated ceilings 
provides control over the total size of the program.
IV. IR&D AND THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
Characteristics of the Defense Market
The special features of military procurement are well
20 . • • known. Unlike other industries, the defense industry is 
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not defined by a given output or product line, but rather as 
the collection of firms which do a substantial percentage of 
their business with the Defense Department. Except for the 
large foreign military sales, which normally are under the 
supervision of the U.S. government, the industry's single 
customer for its military products is the U.S. government. 
The weapons procured frequently involve considerable advances 
in technology; they tend to be highly specialized; and, in­
creasingly, they are procured in only small numbers. Conse­
quently, defense procurement is characterized by relatively 
high rates of risk and by rapid product obsolescence. It is 
also characterized by close relations between the major 
contractors and the procurement offices and by extensive 
regulation. In the absence of a competitive market environ­
ment, the government has sought to supply controls on costs 
and profits through the rules laid down in ASPR, which now 
number thousands of pages and cover almost every conceivable 
aspect of the procurement process.
The rapid rate of technical change in defense procure­
ment and the highly specialized nature of individual pro­
curement items have created a situation in which price 
competition is relatively unimportant. Instead technical 
capability and managerial competence are considered more 
important in source selection, and it is in these areas that 
rivalry between firms occurs. A well-known guide to defense 
contracting states:
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. . . a negotiated procurement is not 
always awarded on the basis of price 
alone. Many times a proposal which is 
technically superior will be favorably 
evaluated and merit the contract, even 
though it will cost the Government more 
money. In fact, it may be observed 
without fear of contradiction that tech­
nical evaluation of modern sophisticated 
weapon or space system proposals is of 
more importance than price.21
Role of IR&D in the Procurement Process
In this general picture of military procurement, several 
features are particularly relevant to IR&D. The government 
has assumed a substantial proportion of the risks associated 
with high technology through its direct contract funding of 
most military R&D and the use of cost-plus contracts and 
contract renegotiation procedures to cover unexpected techni­
cal difficulties. The DOD's IR&D program is an additional 
method by which the risks of the defense business are largely 
shifted from the private contractor to the government. The 
dollar contribution from the government dilutes the risk 
incurred by defense contractors in their IR&D programs by 
automatically covering a large fraction of the costs incurred. 
The risk for the firm lies instead in the danger that it may 
not choose its IR&D projects wisely, and that the projects 
may thus fail, either for technical reasons or because they 
are not of interest to the firm's major customer.
These risks are not unimportant. In order to bid on 
large defense contracts, a contractor must maintain an ex­
pensive specialized work force and facilities. A large 
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volume of sales is very important in covering the cost of 
these resources, and, in recent years, cuts in spending for 
military procurement and a high rate of inflation have in­
tensified pressures on defense contractors. IR&D projects 
are useful in these circumstances, both to chase potential 
contract dollars and to provide employment for company 
engineers who might otherwise have to be laid off.
In this second role, IR&D funds serve as an organiza­
tional cushion, a source of "slack" in the language of or-
22 . ...ganization theory. This stabilizing function meets a 
legitimate need for continuity in R&D, where "keeping the 
team together" may be crucial to assure future contributions. 
Nevertheless, it is susceptible to abuse, and may lead to a 
misallocation of resources if a firm uses its IR&D funds in 
areas which are not promising technologically. Mistaken 
judgments can occur in any field, but nondefense firms, un­
able to recover the costs of their mistakes, have a greater 
incentive for avoiding them.
The IR&D program plays an important role in the close 
relations between the defense industry and the DOD. The 
defense company's need to win new contracts provides a power­
ful incentive for it to shape its IR&D program to match its 
perception of DOD present and future interests. Coupled 
with the desire of DOD program officers to encourage work 
in their own technical areas, the result is a pattern of 
considerable "guidance" of individual IR&D programs by the 
Pentagon. As one R&D manager commented, "Every program 
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manager has his pet projects, and it is easy to discover 
them." Although direct information about other firms' pro­
grams is kept confidential, a firm may be given "negative 
guidance" as part of the debriefing which follows its tech­
nical evaluation; that is, it may be warned that some of its 
proposed projects duplicate work being done by other firms: 
"That field has been plowed already." Direct solicitation 
of IR&D effort in particular areas has also occurred on 
occasion. An example is the development of the engine for 
the C-5A, which over a period of years was developed through 
a combination of "directed" IR&D programs and contract R&D
. 23carried on by several defense contractors. The prevalence 
of DOD influence on the individual company's choice of IR&D 
projects is an important qualification to the word "indepen­
dent" in IR&D.
On the whole, the industry has been successful in its 
use of IR&D to win new business. A 1972 Defense Department 
survey of thirty major contractors indicated that on the 
average 40 to 50 percent of their IR&D projects resulted in
24 . .DOD contracts. By comparison, in another study of non­
defense companies the companies sampled expected only about 
half this success rate. Specifically, they expected that 
about half of their in-house research projects would have a 
50 percent or more probability of being technically success­
ful, that is, of attaining the technical objectives within
25the budgeted time and cost.
An important consequence of the use of IR&D projects 
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as a lead-in to contract business is that the companies tend 
to choose short-run development projects with a high proba­
bility of success over longer-run research projects. Some 
estimates of the development component of the IR&D program 
run as high as 90 percent, while a survey of a sample of Air 
Force contractors found that 65 percent of their programs 
would be classified as either development projects or systems
2 6studies. Further evidence of the short-run character of 
most IR&D projects can be found by analyzing the information 
provided on forty-two projects listed by the defense industry 
as examples of the technological benefits of the IR&D pro-
27 gram. Thirty-six of the projects resulted in DOD contracts 
within two years of project inception; twenty-one led to 
contracts within one year. Three projects acquired contract 
support after three years, and only the remaining three 
projects were pursued for so long as five years before con­
tract support materialized.
Other Benefits of IR&D to the Industry
Besides the need for new contracts, the defense firms 
face other economic pressures, which the IR&D program may 
alleviate. Defense companies complain that the government 
insists on low profit rates in negotiating defense contracts, 
and these complaints are borne out by a number of studies. 
For example, a GAO study found that for 61 defense contractors, 
profits were only 4.1 percent on sales to DOD compared to 
8.3 percent for their commercial sales, a comparison which is,
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2 8 however, controversial. When one considers that in a non­
defense firm funds for in-house R&D must come out of profits, 
it is clear that the Defense Department's payments for IR&D/ 
B&P are an implicit supplement to the profits of the defense 
firms, running about 3 to 4 percent of sales. Furthermore, 
under incentive type contracts a defense firm maximizes its 
profits by avoiding cost overruns. It would be naive not to 
think that IR&D funds are occasionally used to rescue con­
tract work in trouble, thus saving the contractor from over-
29run penalties.
IR&D funds offer defense contractors the means to 
diversify outside the defense industry, so long as the re­
quirement for potential military relevance is met. Congress 
included the PMR requirement in the 1970 law to prevent de­
fense contractors from using DOD funds for IR&D projects 
totally unrelated to national security needs. The require­
ment, however, is only that IR&D projects must have potential 
military relevance. For example, Pratt & Whitney Division 
of United Aircraft Corporation (now United Technologies 
Corporation) was able to charge to its DOD contracts as IR&D 
$87 million in development costs for the JT9D engine used 
in the Boeing 747 and McDonnell Douglas DC 10 aircraft. By 
the end of 1973 Pratt & Whitney had delivered 1301 JT9D 
engines to its commercial customers and 3 to the Department
30of Defense. The Pratt & Whitney case demonstrates the 
kind of advantage a defense contractor can gain in commercial 
markets from IR&D in spite of the PMR requirement.
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A broad interpretation of PMR would seem to cover al­
most everything, and, in practice, the requirement has had
31 virtually no effect on the costs recovered in IR&D programs. 
Nevertheless, the industry and the Defense Department would 
like to see the PMR requirement eliminated, or at least 
broadened to require only government-wide relevance. They 
claim that the lack of observed impact for the requirement 
is a result of the firms' screening projects at an early 
stage before submission of their technical plans to DOD for 
evaluation. They argue further that the agency-relevant 
requirement erodes the independence of the contractor's pro­
grams and tends to distort the composition of the programs 
towards short-term projects, where relevance is easy to 
demonstrate. Removing the requirement however, would run 
counter to a general principle of public accountability, that 
money appropriated to the Department of Defense ought to be 
spent on DOD functions.
Another way in which the defense firm may benefit 
from the IR&D program lies in the favorable patent position 
under the current rules for IR&D. The firm has full pro­
prietary rights for patents resulting from IR&D projects, 
whereas, for patents resulting from contract R&D for DOD, 
the government retains the right to a royalty-free license 
for its own use and can also require the firm to grant li­
censes to other firms ("march-in rights"). The lack of 
government rights to patents from IR&D has been criticized 
as a giveaway to the industry, since the government con­
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tributes heavily financially to the work leading to the 
patents. However, the value in general of patents on defense 
R&D is questionable, since, if the government does not want 
the patented item, there is likely to be no other customer 
for it. It appears that even under IR&D-originated patents 
the government is almost always granted a royalty-free li-
32 cense. Nevertheless, some patentable ideas arising from 
defense R&D may have broad military and commercial applica­
tions, and in these cases the defense firm is definitely 
better off under the rules governing IR&D than under those 
for contract R&D.
In summary, it is easy to see why the defense industry 
favors the IR&D program. In the atmosphere of rapid tech­
nological change which characterizes the defense industry, 
new technological approaches are the key to new business. 
Since fixed-price contracts increase the difficulty of 
passing on cost overruns to the government, there is a pre­
mium on reducing technological uncertainty before bidding. 
IR&D money can be used to carry a project through the early 
development stages before entering into a contract with the 
DOD. With automatic cost recovery, the financial risk to 
the company is reduced; the industry is, in effect, able to 
pursue new business largely at the expense of the government. 
In addition, the IR&D program is a source of organizational 
slack, cushioning the ups and downs of the defense market 
and providing a welcome supplement to the low profit rates 
allowed on defense contracts.
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Impact of IR&D on the Structure of the Defense Industry
The continued flow of funds for the IR&D programs, for 
over twenty-five years now, is bound to have influenced the 
structure of the defense industry. The DOD estimates that 
it does business with over 20,000 firms, but most of the 
contract dollars go to a relatively small group of major 
contractors. The top 100 prime contractors regularly account 
for about 70 percent of the total value of DOD prime con­
tracts; the top 50 companies receive 60 percent, and the top 
25 about 50 percent. For the R&D component of the defense 
spending, the concentration ratio is even higher. In FY 1973, 
the top 50 R&D contractors received 86 percent of all R&D
33 contracts; the top 25 received 75 percent. IR&D payments 
are also heavily concentrated. In 1973 the approximately 
fifty-five contractors with advance agreements for IR&D/B&P 
received about 97 percent of DOD's total reported reimburse-
• •
ments for IR&D/B&P to major contractors (or about 80 percent
34of total payments).
There is substantial similarity in the lists of top 
prime contractors, top R&D contractors and top IR&D con-
35tractors. Table 4 lists the top twenty prime contractors 
for FY 1973 along with their rankings as recipients of RDT&E 
contracts and IR&D/B&P funds. Fourteen companies are among 
the top twenty in all three categories. This is not sur­
prising, given that IR&D programs are presumably concentrated 
in the research-intensive sections of the defense market, 
and that IR&D cost recovery depends on having DOD contracts 
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in the first place. Various technical reasons probably ac­
count for most of the discrepancies between the lists. For 
example, IR&D payments on subcontracts as well as on prime 
contracts are counted in compiling the IR&D list, so a firm 
with important subcontracts would rank higher on that list 
than on the other two lists.
The twenty companies in Table 4 received 45 percent 
by value of the total prime contracts in FY 1973 and 66 per­
cent of the total RDT&E contracts. We estimate therefore 
that they received approximately 55 to 60 percent of the 
total IR&D/B&P payments. Similar reasoning suggests that 
the first twelve companies alone received about 50 percent 
or $400 million of the IR&D/B&P payments in 1973 to major 
contractors.
Membership in the group of firms which dominates the 
defense market has been fairly stable over the past twenty 
years. William Baldwin, in his study of the defense industry 
over the period 1957 to 1964, found that for the top fifty 
firms on the list of 100 prime contractors, there was a net 
turnover of only eighteen firms for the seven year period,
3 6 and of these only four were new entrants to the top 100 list. 
If Baldwin's method of analysis is applied to the fiscal 
years 1967-1973, we find that there were fourteen new names 
in the top fifty list in 1973: one was a temporary con­
sortium of construction companies; three were the result of 
mergers with companies in the top fifty; six more were among 
the top 100 in FY 1967; and only four firms were completely 
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new entries to the top 100 list.
This stability over time in the membership of the list 
of top fifty prime contractors and the substantial agreement 
between the lists of top companies for prime contracts, R&D 
contracts, and IR&D payments are related phenomena. Much of 
the new business in the defense industry is the result of 
continuing changes, large and small, in the available tech­
nology. The contractors' IR&D programs have contributed to 
the institutionlization of technological change in weapons 
technology, while minimizing economic instability. Large 
defense companies have large IR&D programs supported by their 
existing contracts, and their IR&D programs in turn lead to 
more contracts, both in R&D and in procurement. Thus, a 
company which has succeeded in establishing itself as a major 
defense contractor is helped by the IR&D program to retain 
its position in the market.
V. EVALUATION OF THE IR&D PROGRAM
Benefits of the IR&D Program
There is substantial agreement between the Defense 
Department and the defense industry about the desirability 
of the IR&D program. Each of the major goals formally enun­
ciated by the DOD for the program is echoed in the industry, 
restated only slightly to reflect the industry's point of 
view. The Defense Department is concerned to build the 
technology base of the industry, to nurture the expertise 
which makes possible future developments in weaponry and to 
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encourage the exploration of alternative ideas; the industry 
agrees with these objectives and emphasizes the argument 
that innovative and productive R&D flourishes best in an 
environment free of the red tape associated with contract ad­
ministration. The DOD hopes to encourage firms to be active 
in the defense area in order to increase the number of po­
tential competitors bidding on defense contracts; the indus­
try is motivated to maintain an up-to-date capability in 
order to win new contracts. The symbiotic relationship 
between the agency and industry is most evident in their 
support of IR&D on the grounds that it increases the economic 
stability of the industry. The Defense Department argues 
that it needs an economically healthy industry to ensure that 
contractors are available to bid when future need arises, 
while the industry seeks a cushion against shifts in procure­
ment spending.
Pentagon and industry representatives interviewed in 
the course of this study argue that the IR&D program success­
fully meets the goals held for it and should be left unchal­
lenged. They express the view that the problems which had 
afflicted the IR&D program during its rapid growth in the 
1960's are now mostly solved, and that continued Congressional 
questioning of the program reflects only a misunderstanding 
about its aims and accomplishments. But when a billion 
dollars a year is spent by the government on a program which 
does not appear in the federal budget, then more is at stake 
than the sense of mutual benefit which the program engenders
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in the military-industrial complex.
Is the Program Necessary?
At the most basic level we may question if the IR&D 
program is needed at all. The program has, broadly speaking, 
two principal aims—to increase the resources devoted by 
private companies to research and development in defense- 
related technologies, and to foster competition in the de­
fense market. Recently the Defense Department has come to 
emphasize the second goal more strongly than the first. When 
John Foster was Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 
he stressed the notion that IR&D allowed the Defense Depart­
ment to "capitalize on American technological innovation by 
the thousands of technical brains in industry throughout
37the country." Malcolm Currie, the current DDRE, however, 
while still praising the contribution of the IR&D program 
to the technology base, has reserved his eloquence for:
the competitive forces in our free enter­
prise system (which) have been fundamental 
to our productivity and standard of living, 
to our ability to compete successfully in 
the world market-place, and to the attain­
ment of a defense capability which must be 
based increasingly on technological quality 
and efficient production rather than sheer 
brute-force quantity at any cost.
And further:
It [IR&D] is, in fact, absolutely funda­
mental to a competitive industrial capa­
bility which is the high-payoff corner­
stone of our economic system.38
This shift in emphasis has important implications for 
policy, since a program designed primarily to increase com­
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petition will be judged by different standards than one 
intended to increase the technology base. However, our 
analysis of the program suggests that, although IR&D does 
allow defense firms to maintain a high level of in-house R&D 
activity and thus contributes to the technological rivalry 
between defense firms, it cannot contribute to competition 
in a larger sense. The design of the program insures that 
the bulk of the funds are paid to the large well-established 
defense contractors; our estimates indicate that half of the 
total IR&D/B&P payments go to only twelve companies. Since 
IR&D payments are tied to existing defense contracts, smaller 
companies receive smaller amounts, and nondefense companies 
are simply not eligible. Thus, while the IR&D program un­
doubtedly sustains current participants in the defense market, 
it discourages entry by new firms into that market. We 
must conclude that if fostering competition is the primary 
goal of the IR&D program, then the program is an extraordin­
arily expensive and wasteful way to reach that goal. Indeed 
it is doubtful whether any such program can effectively 
simulate competition in a market dominated by a single custo­
mer and extensively regulated by that customer.
Is the IR&D program needed to stimulate R&D in defense 
technology? There is a general argument that private in­
dustry will tend to underinvest in basic research from the 
point of view of society as a whole because only a small 
number of research projects ever have an identifiable pay­
off that can be captured by the company doing the research.
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Government funding is advocated to bring the quantity of 
resources committed to long-range research closer to a so­
cially optimum level.
The case for funding IR&D, however, must be examined
*
in the light of the actual structural conditions prevailing 
in the defense industry. Very large sums of money, roughly 
$6 billion per year, are spent on contract R&D by the Defense 
Department in industry precisely because it recognizes that 
there are insufficient incentives for companies to carry out 
technologically advanced and expensive military R&D projects 
at their own risk. The general arguments for government 
support of R&D activities do not supply a rule for choosing 
an optimum level for such spending; this remains a choice 
to be made politically. Existing mechanisms for making these 
budget decisions are in many ways unsatisfactory, but in the 
case of IR&D they do not even come into play. For all prac­
tical purposes the Congress has not considered the IR&D 
program in relation to the annual RDT&E budget, and it does 
not set the overall level of spending for IR&D.
The defense industry has long argued that IR&D programs 
are a normal and necessary part of doing business and that 
IR&D costs are properly included in the price of its product. 
The industry is on weak ground, however, when it claims that 
IR&D costs should be recovered from the government as from 
any other customer. This would make sense if the government 
were one of many customers for a standard product sold by 
many producers: if, in fact, there were price competition in 
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the defense market. But in those areas of defense procure­
ment which involve advanced technology, the government is 
usually the single customer, with a choice of very few, often 
only one, potential suppliers. The size of the IR&D program 
in a defense company is not set by impersonal market forces,
I
but is directly related to the size of program which the 
government is prepared to pay for, and is set through nego­
tiation. If there were no negotiated ceilings the companies 
would have every incentive to expand their IR&D programs in 
an escalating pattern, constrained only by the availability 
of scientific resources and the burden of that part of the 
cost borne by the company itself. This escalation would be 
a natural result of the extent to which technological, as 
opposed to price, competition does exist in the defense mar­
ket. The technological rivalry, in turn, however, is based 
on the special demand characteristics of the single govern­
ment customer; in such a situation it is misleading to invoke 
the name of normal business practices!
Furthermore, the theoretical arguments for government 
support of R&D are strongest for basic research, and become 
progressively less significant as one moves through the 
spectrum to applied research and exploratory development 
where technological risks are smaller and proprietary rights 
to the results are more easily safeguarded. The evidence 
suggests that most IR&D projects fall in the area of develop­
ment of new products rather than basic or applied research, 
and certainly most technical work in the B&P category must 
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belong to the product development area. Considering that 
IR&D projects become profitable to the defense firm when they 
are converted to R&D contracts, while a nongovernment R&D 
project must undergo privately financed commercial develop­
ment before it can begin to make money for the firm, one 
could argue that government support of IR&D is not needed to 
supply adequate incentives for military-related R&D. One 
can go further. Industry will always push its IR&D towards 
product development. If DOD wants to encourage long-range
39research, it needs a different mechanism.
Despite these reservations, however, an argument can
be made for the IR&D program on the grounds that it encour-
ages an innovative atmosphere which is lacking in contract
R&D:
At any given time, a company is in the 
best position to evaluate its own best 
ideas and prospects. When research pro­
jects are judged not fruitful in terms 
of technical success or practical appli­
cation, they can be promptly abandoned 
and a new approach or entirely new project 
quickly substituted. It is this freedom 
to continue pursuit of promising concepts 
or results, and to terminate technical 
efforts not achieving their objectives 
that is vital to the continued success 
of any contractor, and to his ability to 
compete successfully for new business.40
The claim that IR&D programs are valuable because of their 
greater flexibility is persuasive; one has only to read 
through the formal requirements for letting a defense con­
tract to realize how cumbersome the procedures for initiating
41or changing a contract are. As with any program, however, 
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the expected benefits should be compared to the costs before 
a judgment is made. Even if one is persuaded of the need for 
military-related R&D in addition to the programs included in 
the RDT&E budget, and is additionally persuaded that the 
IR&D program does pull resources in the desired direction, 
the actual working of the program must be evaluated to see 
if it is meeting its goals.
Is the Program Well Managed?
The problem with the IR&D program is that the facts 
are not available to make an independent assessment of its 
value. The IR&D program has grown to its present size and 
complexity with scarcely any participation by Congress in 
forming government policy for the program. Considering the 
substantial sums of public money involved, Congress has been 
notably lax in its oversight function. It has not required 
DOD to report either details on the program's operation or 
program results. The Defense Department has acquiesced in 
the industry's desire for secrecy and the Annual Reports on 
IR&D/B&P contain only aggregated data on the size of the 
program. The lack of detailed information minimizes the 
possibility of complaints from the contractors about unfair 
treatment, and it reduces the chance that a competitor might 
learn something important about a company's program, but it 
makes it impossible to analyze the overall costs and benefits 
of the program. Individual companies can and do list some 
impressive accomplishments which they credit to their IR&D 
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programs, but, in the absence of information on the cost 
of producing these technological advances no conclusions can 
be drawn.
The DOD believes that its present regulations, covering 
technical evaluation, military relevance, and the negotia­
tion of advance agreements, offer sufficient controls on the 
IR&D program. The question is, of course, how effective 
are these controls in practice? The DOD itself may not be 
to tell. Malcolm Currie, DDRE, has estimated that abuses in 
the form of unwisely managed projects run only one to two
43percent of the total IR&D program, but this figure is so 
low as to be scarcely credible. Even though IR&D's role in 
gaining new business is a powerful motive for good manage­
ment of the program, the companies are under other pressures 
as well. IR&D is a convenient accounting category for ab­
sorbing a variety of problems, from cost overruns to redun­
dant personnel. Realistically, we must expect that in the 
broad spectrum of companies receiving IR&D payments, there 
are contractors using the program for these purposes who are 
not detected.
DOD's management procedures for IR&D exhibit some 
weaknesses. The military services have had difficulty in 
matching proposed company projects for IR&D with in-house 
scientists technically equipped to evaluate them and in 
insuring that the evaluation process is given a high priority
44by the service laboratories. The evaluations may reward 
elaborate write-ups rather than good technical effort. 
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Triennial on-site inspections are supposed to serve as a 
check on this possibility, but the on-site review process 
has inadequacies of its own, and may equally misrepresent 
the quality of a company's program.
The technical evaluation procedure for IR&D proposals, 
when working as intended, is not very different from the 
peer review system which is the basic device for screening 
research projects for agencies such as the National Science 
Foundation. The fundamental problem with the IR&D procedures 
is that the results of the evaluation are only weakly linked 
to the negotiation for an advanced agreement. Furthermore, 
there is no evaluation of completed projects on a regular 
basis, so that comparison of the cost-effectiveness of the 
IR&D program to other DOD programs for support of R&D is not 
possible.
The negotiation of advance agreements with its major 
contractors has allowed the DOD to control the total volume 
of its payments for IR&D. However, because of variations 
in accounting practices, product lines, and the proportion 
of defense sales to total sales, the size and rate of cost 
recovery on IR&D programs are not directly comparable be­
tween companies. The negotiation mechanism is supposed to 
allow for these variations, but the very flexibility of the 
procedure ensures that there is no obvious way to measure 
the effectiveness and fairness of the controls. On the DOD 
side, despite instructions calling for consistent treatment 
of all contractors, substantial differences continue between 
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the services in their approach to the IR&D negotiations. 
Whether or not these differences result in a systematic bias 
in the size of negotiated agreements is impossible to tell 
from the information which is publicly available.
What Should Be Done?
It is clear that the present IR&D program suffers from 
serious deficiencies in meeting the objectives held for it 
by DOD. Following the Congressional hearings held in 
September 1975, the Congress and Defense Department should 
move to correct these deficiencies. A prerequisite to re­
form should be a clear statement by Congress of the objectives 
for the IR&D program. Such a statement would help to resolve 
the controversy surrounding program accountability, relevancy 
requirements and the appropriate level of support, by placing 
the IR&D program in the context of national priorities.
At least two possible courses of action are open for 
reforming the IR&D program. The existing procedures could 
be retained, but modified to increase accountability to 
Congress and the public and to improve DOD's management of 
the program. Alternatively, the IR&D program could be re­
placed by a different set of mechanisms designed to supply 
program accountability while avoiding the bias towards short- 
run development projects and the favored position of the 
largest defense contractors which is inevitable under the 
present procedures.
Even if the program is left in place, there is a 
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fundamental need for more public information before Congress 
can fulfill its responsibility for effective oversight. 
Ideally, one would like a clear identification of the bene­
fits of the IR&D program to measure against the approximately 
one billion dollars expended on it. Practically, however, 
it is not feasible to quantify all the benefits from IR&D 
projects because of external effects, the long time lags 
associated with R&D programs, and the proprietary elements 
in the projects. However, DOD can and should make public 
the names of the companies involved, the amounts received, 
and the general nature of the work performed. The industry 
may oppose the disclosure of this information, but it is 
difficult to see how such disclosure would violate company 
rights. The information would at least make it possible to 
compare IR&D to other R&D programs and to gauge the economic 
impact of the IR&D program on the structure of the defense 
industry.
Congress should consider the costs of the IR&D program 
in relation to the total RDT&E budget and to the balance 
between resources allocated to service laboratories, to 
contract R&D in industry, and to IR&D. The IR&D program 
should enter explicitly into discussions of funding for the 
technology base, something which, in the past, has not
45 . .happened. To this end more information on the distribution 
of IR&D projects along the spectrum stretching from basic 
research to development and bid and proposal would be useful. 
This information is available to the Defense Department for 
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individual projects as part of the technical evaluation pro­
cedures, but it has not been collected and summarized for 
the program as a whole. The DOD should also undertake a 
review of completed IR&D projects on a regular basis to 
facilitate comparison of the results from IR&D with those 
from contract R&D.
Coupled with more informed Congressional oversight, the 
internal management of the IR&D program by DOD should be 
modified to increase program accountability. Given the 
obstacles raised by the question of proprietary rights and 
the general difficulties in measuring benefits from IR&D, it 
is probably not possible to require a detailed public ac­
counting for the IR&D program. It is all the more necessary, 
therefore, that DOD controls should assure that the public 
funds expended for IR&D are directed to the goals set for 
the program. Accountability would be greatly improved by 
moving the technical evaluation process to a more central 
position in the negotiation of advance agreements, linking 
the company's technical score firmly to its negotiated ceil­
ing .
The modifications proposed above would offer substantial 
improvements to the current IR&D program. But the Congress 
should also consider more radical alternatives to the IR&D 
program. One possibility would be to reduce the size of the 
program drastically, by shifting the "guided" IR&D projects 
to contract status, possibly under the aegis of the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense.
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Support for more speculative, less well-defined projects 
could be continued under a much reduced IR&D program or by 
"level of effort" contracts in which only the general area 
of technology and the resources to be committed would be 
specified. This type of contract already exists; its use 
could be expanded to provide contractors with the funds and 
incentives to continue basic and applied research in weapons 
technology.
Another possibility which should be considered is the 
use of a higher profit rate on defense contracts in lieu of 
payments for IR&D. This method would minimize the adminis­
trative controls necessary and maximize each contractor's 
freedom of choice with respect to allocation of his firm's 
resources. Contractors are skeptical of this proposal on 
the grounds that the promised profit gains would be chipped 
away by the government in contract negotiations. However, 
this need not happen. Such a policy change could be more 
effective than any government-regulated program in stimulat­
ing additional competition in the defense market, by making 
it more attractive for firms to bid on defense contracts.
VI. Conclusion
A genuine dilemma exists for the present IR&D program 
between the goals of promoting an innovative environment for 
defense-related R&D and insuring that public funds are spent 
wisely, with adequate procedures for public accountability. 
The present system for IR&D is defended by its supporters on 
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the grounds that it is the best compromise which can be had. 
A careful examination of the program however, leaves many 
questions unanswered. There are too many areas in which the 
claims for the program cannot be substantiated, and too many 
issues raised which had not even been considered by Congress 
prior to the recent hearings. Congress should consider the 
size of the program in relation to total R&D spending by the 
Defense Department. It should question in detail the effec­
tiveness of DOD's management of the program, the value of the 
"products" of the program in relation to its costs, and its 
effects on the structure of the defense market. These issues 
deserve a thorough airing before any decision is made on 
the future of the IR&D program. At the least, the program 
should be modified to increase public accountability and 
improve DOD's management. In the long run the national 
interest may be best served by replacing the present IR&D 
program with alternative methods for achieving innovative 
R&D in defense technology.
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Grand Total
Total as % of DOD
Table 1. DOD's and NASA's Payments for IR&D, B&P and OTE to
Major Contractors: Dollar Amounts and as a Percent­
age of Sales (Millions of Dollars)
Year IR&D B&P
IR&D
B&P OTE
Grand
Total
or NASA
Sales
1963 197 178
DOD
375 84 459 2.56
1964 199 182 381 71 452 2.75
1965 198 186 344 76 460 2.94
1966 224 202 426 91 517 2.89
1967 277 230 507 92 599 2.80
1968 338 271 609 64 673 3.02
1969 410 289 699 79 778 3.43
1970 376 278 654 60 714 3.35
1971 354 265 619 49 668 3.41
1972 392 306 698 37 735 3.85
1973 441 360 801 32 819 3.91
1974 457 351 808 na — —
1963 24 23
NASA
47 10 57 na
1964 50 43 93 28 121 na
1965 60 55 155 17 131 na
1966 69 68 137 17 154 3.4
1967 58 50 108 16 124 3.3
1968 61 46 107 14 121 3.7
1969 43 49 92 15 107 4.1
1970 44 48 92 9 101 4.7
1971 41 51 92 7 99 5.0
1972 40 50 90 0 90 4.5
1973 40 47 85 0 85 4.8
1974 (est) 41 41 82 0 82 4.1
na = not available
Sources:
DOD: 1963-67 Report of the Commission on Government Procure­
ment , Vol. 2, p. 35.
1968-72 GAO, "Partial Report—In-Depth Investigation into 
IR&D and B&P Programs," B-164912, Aug. 16, 1974, p. 6.
1973-74 "Annual Report on IR&D/B&P, 1974," Congressional 
Record, April 9, 1975, S-5563.
NASA: Information supplied by NASA
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Table 2. IR&D/B&P Payments by DOD to Major Contractors 
and Budget Outlays for RDT&E, 1963-74 (Millions 
of Dollars)
Year
......IR&D
B&P RDT&E
IR&D as % 
RDT&E
1963 375 6376 5.9
1964 381 7021 5.4
1965 344 6236 5.5
1966 426 6259 6.8
1967 507 7160 . 7.1
1968 609 7747 7.9
1969 699 7457 9.4
1970 654 7166 9.1
1971 619 7303 8.5
1972 698 7881 8.9
1973 801 8157 9.8
1974 808 8582 9.4
Budget Review Division, "Federal Government 
Finances," mimeo, February 1975.
Source: Table 1, and Office of Management and Budget,
-63-
Table 3. IR&D/B&P Payments Compared to DOD Budgeted
Expenditure for the Technology Base, 1974
IR&D, B&P Payments5
IR&D—major contractors
B&P—major contractors
Total
Estimated total IR&D/B&P payments-- 
all contractors*
Millions 
of $
457
351
808
1010
Expenditures from RDT&E Budget for Millions
Research and Exploratory Development13 of $
Spent in-house 683
Spent in industry 482
Other (Universities, FCRC's) 238
Total 1403
aCalendar Year 1974
^Fiscal Year 1974
Total IR&D/B&P payments to all contractors estimated by 
taking reported payments to be 80 percent of true total.
Source: "Annual Report on IR&D/B&P, for 1974," Congressional
Record, April 9, 1975, p. S 5563; and Dr. Malcolm 
Currie, DDR&E, "The Department of Defense Program of 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, FY 1975," 
statement to the 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1974, 
pp. 7-43.
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Table 4. Top Twenty Prime Contractors for DOD with their 
Rank as R&D Contractors and Receivers of IR&D 
Payments, 1973
Company
Rank on Lists for:
Prime
Contracts3
RDT&E
Contracts3
IR&D
Payments^
Lockheed 1 2 7
General Electric 2 6 2
Boeing 3 4 3
McDonnell Douglas 4 1 8
Grumman 5 5 17
AT&T (Western Electric) 6 7 34
Textron 7 34 12
United Technologies
(formerly United Aircraft) 8 11 1
General Dynamics 9 8 19
Rockwell-International 10 3 5
Raytheon 11 9 4
Hughes Aircraft 12 10 6
Westinghouse 13 15 16
Sperry Rand 14 20 20
Northrop 15 29 15
Litton 16 32 31
LTV Corporation 17 26 9
IBM 18 13 22
Honeywell 19 24 18
RCA 20 12 10
3Fiscal Year
^Calendar Year
Rankings for RDT&E contracts have been adjusted to include 
contracts awarded to company subsidiaries. The volume of 
IR&D payments contributing to the listed ranks includes pay­
ments on subcontracts as well as contracts.
Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of 
Prime Contract Awards, FY 1973" and "500 Contractors 
Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Military 
Prime Contract Awards for RDT&E, FY 1973"; OASD 
(I&L) Major IR&D Contractors (unpublished).
Source: Department of Defense, OASD (Comptroller), "100
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